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CURRENT LEGISLATION AND DECISIONS
Aerial Crop Spraying - Inherently Dangerous Activity
Non-delegable Duty - Theories of Liability
During 1961, three cases involving liability for damages caused by
aerial crop spraying reached the supreme courts of three different states.
The theories employed by the courts in arriving at the decisions present
an interesting contrast in two areas. These are (1) the liability of a land-
owner for the conduct of the sprayer, and (2) the theories of liability
for the damages caused. The purpose of this note is to point up the dis-
tinguishing features of the cases and to compare them to past decisions.
In one case defendant landowner employed the defendant aerial spray-
ing company to rid the former's property of weeds. The herbicide spray
spread to the plaintiff's cotton crops causing substantial damage. The
trial court found that the spraying operations had been conducted
negligently and that the landowner was liable along with the aerial
sprayer. The Texas Court of Civil Appeals affirmed. Held: judgment
against landowner reversed. Under the facts of this case, the aerial sprayer
is an independent contractor to whom the risk of harm may be delegated,
thereby absolving the landowner from liability for such operations. Pitch-
fork Land & Cattle Co. v. King, 346 S.W.2d 598 (Tex. Sup. Ct. 1961).
The second case involved damage to the seed crops of the plaintiff
which were sprayed by the defendant aerial applicator. The plaintiff based
his claim on a theory of trespass. The trial court granted an involuntary
nonsuit to the defendant landowner because the other defendant was
an independent contractor. At the close of evidence the aerial sprayer
was given a directed verdict. Held: reversed and remanded as to both
defendants. The aerial sprayer is strictly liable for damages caused by his
spraying without regard to any negligent acts committed by him. The
landowner is also liable because aerial spraying is an inherently dangerous
activity and he is not permitted to insulate himself from a suit for
damages by hiring an independent contractor. Loe v. Lenhardt, 362 P.2d
312 (Ore. Sup. Ct. 1961).
In the third case the plaintiff was covered with poisonous chemical
insecticides sprayed from an aircraft as he worked on a gin platform
contiguous to a cotton field being treated for insect pests. He became
seriously ill and later sued the aerial sprayer, the lessee of the land and
the owner lessor basing his suit on a negligence theory. Held: the sprayer
and the lessee are liable. The lessee of the premises, whose crops were being
treated, may not delegate the work of dusting or spraying a crop with
poisonous insecticides to an independent contractor and thus avoid
liability. Lawler v. Skelton, 130 So.2d 565 (Miss. Sup. Ct. 1961).
The holdings in the Loe and Lawler cases are more nearly in accord
with the great weight of authority on the issue of a landowner's liability
for injuries caused by an aerial sprayer.' The common-law rule that an
' See, e.g., McKennon v. Jones, 224 S.W.2d 138 (Ark. 1951); Heeb v. Prysock, 245 S.W.2d
577 (Ark. 1952); S. A. Gerrard Co. v. Fricker, 27 P.2d 678 (Ariz. 1933).
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employer is not liable for the torts of an independent contractor hired by
him has been limited somewhat by the so-called "intrinsically dangerous"
exception! If the activity is of such a nature that it involves a high degree
of risk to others, the duty not to harm which is owed to these persons is
said to be non-delegable.
The courts in almost every jurisdiction in which the point has been
considered have held that aerial spraying or dusting is an "intrinsically
dangerous" activity. Accordingly they have uniformly decided that an
employer cannot escape liability for damage caused by drifting herbicides
or insecticides by hiring an independent contractor to do the work.' How-
ever, most of the cases deciding the issue have involved damage caused to
persons, property or animals located within close proximity of the spraying
operations.' Dean Prosser suggests that the "intrinsically dangerous" ex-
ception may not apply in those cases where there is not a high degree of
risk in relation to the immediate surroundings.' The blasting case cited by
him in support of that proposition certainly seems analogous to the spray-
ing operations, particularly in view of the frequent comparisons of the
two activities made by the courts.! In Holt v. Texas-N.M. Pipeline Co.'
the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals held that an employer was not liable
for the injuries caused to a third party incident to blasting operations
carried on by an independent contractor in barren rural areas. The court
stated that such work under these conditions was not even intrinsically
dangerous!
In the Pitchfork case the closest cotton farm to the area being treated
was some seven and a half miles distant.' On the other hand, in the
Lawler case the plaintiff informed the lessee defendant that he would be
working on the platform at a distance of twenty to thirty feet from the
cotton field.' Clearly the risk to the plaintiff was great in view of the
toxic qualities of the insecticide and the proximity of the platform to
the field. The courts do not discuss the point in any of these cases, but
it seems particularly applicable to a determination of whether crop
spraying is in fact an inherently dangerous activity."
The holding in the Pitchfork case is not actually as broad as it might
first appear. It does not stand for the proposition that all inherently dan-
gerous activities may be delegated to an independent contractor under
Texas law. Many cases have held that the duty incident to these activities
is non-delegable." Nor does it state that crop spraying is not inherently
dangerous. The decision in this case is undoubtedly the result of plain-
tiffs' failure to submit and prove their issue on dangerous instrumentali-
"Prosser, Torts 359-61 (2d ed. 1955).
'See cases supra note 1.
'For an extensive list of these cases see Comment, 40 Texas L. Rev. 527, n. 47 (1962).
5Prosser, Torts 361 (2d ed. 1955).
eSee, e.g., Loe v. Lenhardt, 362 P.2d 312 (Ore. 1961).
7 145 F.2d 862 (5th Cir.), cert. den. 325 U.S. 879 (1945).
a145 F.2d at 863.
' 346 S.W.2d at 599.
"0 130 So.2d at 567.
" In the Loe case the court weighs the proximity factor to determine whether the activity was
extra-hazardous for purposes of strict liability, but does not discuss it in relation to the problem
of non-delegable duty. 362 P.2d at 317.
1a See, e.g., Galveston-Houston Electric Ry. Co. v. Reinle, 258 S.W. 803, 805 (Tex. 1924).
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ties." Hence, Pitchfork is precedent, at most, for the proposition that in
Texas crop spraying is not extremely dangerous as a matter of law. Upon
this basis the case does not present too radical a departure from other
decisions in this area.
The second point of interest raised by these three cases involves the
theory of liability upon which the plaintiffs recover. The jury in the Texas
trial court made specific findings of negligence which supported the judg-
ment against the aerial sprayer."' It seems unlikely that the Texas courts
would permit a recovery in the absence of such findings."5 There are many
cases from other jurisdictions which also couch the basis of recovery in
negligence terms.
In the Loe case, the Oregon Supreme Court concluded that the de-
fendants were liable for an unintentional trespass committed by them
through their drifting spray. The court expressly stated that negligence
is not necessary for recovery under the facts. It held that aerial spraying
was an inherently dangerous activity, that this was a question of law to
be determined by the court and that the rules of the Restatement of Torts
relating to innocent trespass applied.
The Lawler case presents still another aspect of this question. The jury
in the trial court found for the defendants in spite of the overwhelming
evidence showing negligence which proximately caused plaintiff's injuries.
The court stated that "the issue of liability contains two factors, (1)
whether plaintiff was sprayed by [the aerial applicator] with a chemical
mixture, and (2) whether the spraying was a proximate cause of his
acute illness."' " The court mentioned acts committed by the pilot which
could be constitute negligence, 7 but it was concerned primarily with the
question of proximate cause. Hence this case seems to fall somewhere
between the doctrine followed by the Texas court and that adopted by
the Oregon court.
The several comments which have been written on this subject all
seem to agree that there are three classes of cases dealing with aerial
spraying." The first is exemplified by the Texas case in which the court
relies upon specific acts of negligence to find liability; the second is
represented by the Lawler case from Mississippi where the court seems to
decide that merely spraying under the particular circumstances is neg-
ligence; the third is that of strict liability. There have been only two
cases decided on this basis, and Loe is the first to employ the Restatement
"Brief for appellant, pp. 33-35, Pitchfork Land and Cattle Co. v. King, 355 S.W.2d 624
(Tex. Civ. App. 1961).
14 335 S.W.2d 624 (Tex. Civ. App. 1961). The grounds were failure to confine the herbicide
outside the boundary of the cotton crops in question, failure to use a wind gauge to check the
velocity and direction of the wind, failure to properly mix the materials, failure to discover within
a reasonable time after beginning the spraying that the velocity of the wind would cause the
spray to drift and settle on the cotton, and that the wind was blowing over ten miles per hour on
the occasion of the spraying. Id. at 629.
" Texas purports not to recognize a doctrine of strict liability. The leading case on the point
is Turner v. Big Lake Oil Co., 97 S.W.2d 221 (Tex. 1936). See also Vrazel v. Bieri, 294 S.W.2d
148 (Tex. Civ. App. 1956) where the court refused to impose liability in the absence of any
finding of unreasonable action on the part of the defendant crop duster. The court said that
it would not consider the spraying negligence per se because to do so would be to impose strict
liability upon the defendant.
16 130 So.2d at 569.
17 Id at 567 (turning on the spray directly over the platform).
"$See Note, 43 Minn. L. Rev. 531 (1959); Crop Dusting: Legal Problems in a New Industry,
6 Stan. L. Rev. 69 (1953); Comment, 40 Texas L. Rev. 527 (1962).
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doctrine." At least one writer has suggested that this is the most ap-
propriate theory for recovery particularly in view of the potential harm."0
These cases continue to come up through the courts of almost every
state in which there is substantial agricultural activity. The benefits from
crop dusting or spraying in the form of insect and weed control are un-
doubted. However these benefits must be weighed against the dangerous
characteristics of herbicides and insecticides and against the damage which
they can cause if not properly controlled. The theories of liability will
probably continue to be divergent in the various jurisdictions, but this
is certainly not a characteristic unique to this particular field of tort law.
Charles Ted Raines, Jr.
Air Carriers - Tortious Conduct - Actual and Exemplary
Damages Awarded "Bumped Passenger"-
C.A.B. Penalty Agreement
Plaintiff sued defendant airline charging unjust discrimination, violation
of Section 404(b) of the Civil Aeronautics Act.1 Defendant removed
plaintiff from a flight on which plaintiff had confirmed reservations.
Held: Defendant wantonly violated plaintiff's right to accommodations
constituting tortious conduct for which plaintiff was awarded actual and
exemplary damages. Wills v. Trans World Airlines, Inc., 200 F. Supp.
360 (S.D. Calif. 1961).
Almost without exception, the prohibition against discrimination in Sec-
tion 404(b) 2 of the Act has been applied to cases involving competitive
practices' among the airlines." However, in Fitzgerald v. Pan American
World Airways,' the court held that the unreasonable discrimination pro-
hibition of Section 404(b) creates a federal civil-right cause of action.!
The court reasoned that violation of the statute was a federal crime, and
thus when the statute is violated, a federal cause of action accrues to the
class of individuals protected by the statute.
In this case, plaintiff complied fully with Passenger Rule 12., By doing
"' The other case is Gotreaux v. Gary, 94 So.2d 293 (La. 1957), noted in 32 Tul. L. Rev. 146.
There the court based its decision upon a civil law statute pertaining to harm to adjoining
landowners for activity on one's own property.
'0 Note, 43 Minn. L. Rev. 532 (1959).
'Civil Aeronautics Act, Title IV, 72 Stat. 760 (1958), 49 U.S.C.A. § 1374(b).
2 Ibid. "No air carrier or foreign air carrier shall make, give or cause any undue or un-
reasonable preference or advantage to any particular person, port, locality, or description of traffic
in air transportation in any respect whatsoever, or subject any particular person, port, locality
or description of traffic in air transportation to any unjust discrimination or any undue or un-
reasonable prejudice or disadvantage in any respect whatsoever."
'Summer Excursion Cases, 11 C.A.B. 218 (1950).
'See generally, Gellman, Regulation of Competition in U. S. Domestic Air Transportation:
A Judicial Survey and Analysis, 25 J. Air L. & Com. 149.
5229 F.2d 499 (2d Cir. 1956). This case concerned an allegation by Negroes that they had
been "bumped" because of discrimination by the airline because of their race and color. This
case is the only reported decision which deals with discrimination under the Civil Aeronautics
Act other than the competition cases.
'Cowen v. Winter, 96 Fed. 929 (6th Cir. 1899).
"Passenger Rule 12 of the applicable tariff filed under the authority of 49 U.S.C.A. 5 1373
sets out that "the carrier will cancel the reservation ... of any passenger from any point
named on his ticket or exchange order unless the passenger advises the carrier of his intention to
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so, he acquired a priority right' to accommodations over passengers with
reservations confirmed subsequent to his. Defendant arbitrarily cancelled
plaintiff's tourist seat reservation in order to accommodate a first-class
passenger. This discriminatory action violated plaintiff's rights and Section
404 (b) of the Act. The court justified its jurisdiction over the matter in
the following manner. The Civil Aeronautics Board, although the watch-
dog of the airlines," had no authority to grant redress or damages for past
violations,0 thus there was no conflict of jurisdiction and in fact only the
courts could grant adequate relief." Finding plaintiff's rights abused, the
court awarded actual damages to the plaintiff." The court also awarded
$5,000 exemplary damages on the theory that the right to grant
punitive damages was justified by statutory"3 implication advanced in
Hague v. Committee for Industrial Organization," and that those damages
were justified by defendant's intentional and wanton disregard of plaintiff's
rights."
The true significance of this case is found not in the legal reasoning
alone; its significance lies in the apparent effect it had in accelerating the
airlines' attempts to solve a major problem in this area. The basic cause
for an airline overbooking its flights stems from the air carrier's concern
over confirmed passengers failing to appear for their scheduled flights.
When a passenger fails to cancel his reservation, a flight may depart with
empty seats which could have been sold. To alleviate this problem, eleven
major airlines'" submitted a proposal to the CAB which would permit a
service charge to be assessed against "no show" passengers.' The CAB,
aware of the frequent overbooking indulged in by the airlines,8 tentatively
agreed to the proposal and made final approval contingent on a reciprocal
penalty being assessed against the airlines for overbooking, whether it be
inadvertent 8 or intentional. On March 1, 1962, the CAB approved an
agreement incorporating penalties for both "no shows" and overbooking.0
This agreement went into effect May 1, 1962 on a trial basis for a period
of six months.
use his reservation by communicating with a reservation or ticket office of the carrier at such
point at least six hours before his scheduled flight departure time."
849 U.S.C.A. 5 1304. "There is recognized and declared to exist in behalf of any citizen of
the United States a public right of freedom of transit through the navigable airspace of the
United States."
849 U.S.C.A. 5 402.
10 49 U.S.C.A. 5 1482.
" Wills v. Trans World Airlines, Inc., 200 F. Supp. 360, 365 (1961). The court stated that
an "alternative to a Federal cause of action for the aggrieved airline passenger is to remit a
plaintiff to his remedy in the State courts, based on a State created cause of action. But this
recourse would fall short of effectuating the purposes of the Act."
"2 Plaintiff's only out of pocket damages were found to be $1.54.
1342 U.S.C.A. § 1983.
14 101 F.2d 774, 789 (3d Cir. 1939) modified on other grounds, 307 U.S. 496 (1939).
"Lake Shore M.S. Ry. Co. v. Prentice, 147 U.S. 101 (1893).
"o These eleven are: American, Braniff, Continental, Delta, Eastern, National, Northeast, North-
west, Trans World, United and Western.
17 1A Av. L. Rep. Para. 21,241 (Current C.A.B. Cases, Jan. 8, 1962).
'"C.A.B. Overbooking Practices of Trunkline Carriers, Docket 11683.
1"Eastern Airline Overbooking Enforcement Proceedings, Docket 8726, (Order Set. No.
E-14962 (Feb. 26, 1960) ). (Overbooking through human error or communication lag does not
constitute a violation of the Civil Aeronautics Act.)
20 1A Av. L. Rep. Para 21,258 (Current C.A.B. Cases, March 1, 1962). The charge to "no
shows" is 5 dollars or 50% whichever is greater of the applicable one-way fare of the first re-
maining validated flight coupon, with a maximum charge of 40 dollars. The penalty for oversales
is similar; however, there are certain conditions which may relieve the carrier from making pay-
ments for bversales.
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The problem of collecting these penalties is manifest. However, it is
hoped that the very existence of these potential penalties will reduce the
necessity for such collection. It is hoped that if the traveling public is
apprised of the "no show" penalty they will be more likely to inform
the airlines of intended cancellations. Conversely, the airlines will be less
likely to oversell their flights if overbooking produces penalties. Certainly
the decision in the Wills case will insure the latter.
Harry Crutcher, III
